Insights from choice experiments.
LLMs as economic actors — what preferences govern their choices?
What utility function, if any, does an LLM have? Do its choices adhere to the rationality axioms of completeness, monotonicity, and transitivity?
Agentic AI cannot be deployed in an economically coherent way when the preferences governing its actions are neither measured nor targetable.
At each generation step, the model maps context $x$ to a logit vector over its full vocabulary $\mathcal{V}$. The next token is drawn from:
This admits an exact Random Utility representation:
A portfolio choice laboratory and a structural model of risk preference.
Each prompt presents a binary menu $\{A, B\}$ where the two options are portfolios with known expected return $\mu_i$ and standard deviation $\sigma_i$, fully observed by the researcher and directly shown to the model.
Pre-softmax logits on the label tokens are directly observed via the API. Within-menu logit gap identifies utility directly.
Only the sampled output token is observed. Standard MLE on the binary choice probability recovers structural parameters.
Specializing the logit index to the portfolio setting, with $R_i = \sigma_i^2 + \mu_i^2$ as the raw second moment:
Substituting into the logit spec $u_i = \kappa V_i + c$ gives the estimating equation:
The structural risk parameter is the ratio:
How much probability mass falls on the menu label tokens? Values near 1 validate the revealed-preference interpretation.
Does the model prefer the stochastically dominating portfolio? Fraction of dominance pairs correctly ordered.
Are rankings consistent across menus? Largest fraction of menus jointly rationalized by a single preference ordering.
Rationality diagnostics, risk preference estimates, and the effect of fine-tuning.
| Model | Completeness $\mathcal{C}$ | Monotonicity $\mathcal{M}$ | Transitivity $\mathcal{T}$ |
|---|---|---|---|
| — Placeholder: results pending — | |||
| Model A (base) | — | — | — |
| Model B (base) | — | — | — |
| Model C (base) | — | — | — |
| Model D (base) | — | — | — |
All indices are in $[0, 1]$. Exact axiom satisfaction corresponds to a value of 1. Inference follows from the experimental design's within-menu structure.
| Model | $\hat{\beta}$ (logits) | $\hat{\beta}$ (choices) | Interpretation |
|---|---|---|---|
| — Placeholder: results pending — | |||
| Model A (base) | — | — | — |
| Model B (base) | — | — | — |
| Model C (base) | — | — | — |
| Model D (base) | — | — | — |
Because each model can be estimated from a large menu set, the aggregation problem motivating mixed-logit methods in human populations is attenuated — we recover a single $\hat{\beta}$ per model.
Inference for $\hat{\beta}$ uses the Delta method (logit regime: robust SEs; choice regime: Fieller-type intervals near weak-ratio cases).
We treat post-training alignment as a targeted preference induction treatment. The object of interest is the change in the structural parameter after fine-tuning:
If fine-tuning systematically shifts $\hat{\beta}$ in a predictable direction, alignment procedures can in principle be used as a tool for economic preference targeting in deployed systems.
Contributions, limitations, and implications for agentic AI deployment.
Agentic AI cannot be deployed in an economically coherent and internally consistent way when the preferences governing its actions are neither measured nor targetable.
Scope. Results are identified within the portfolio choice domain. Portability to other domains is a distinct empirical question — one that requires a prior benchmark of the kind this paper establishes.
Questions, critiques, and counter-examples warmly invited.